

Watch 1415
SD 739-106~~TOP SECRET~~**CONFIDENTIAL**WATCH COMMITTEE
of the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

1. **KOREA:** Continuing indications of a Communist logistical and personnel build-up and reports of enemy plans for a further offensive reflect the steadily increasing Communist capability to undertake a major offensive with little warning. The high level of vehicle sightings continues, supplies are disposed in forward areas, and there are reports of the arrival of Chinese Communist replacements. Additional evidence supports the probability of the existence of a CCF mechanized force supplied with Soviet equipment, and there are indications of preparations for the employment of larger mechanized forces in Korea, but there is no firm evidence of the presence of CCF mechanized troops in Korea. Various reports continue to allege the presence in Korea of small Soviet or "Caucasian" combat or support units but the presence of Soviet personnel other than advisers, technicians, and AAA troops has not been confirmed. Increased enemy night air activity over Korea has been marked by the use of high performance conventional aircraft and some jets. Photo coverage reveals the existence of a second operational jet airfield on the Manchurian-Korean border. Communist propaganda continues generally adamant on the question of the demarcation line. North Korean and Soviet broadcasts have reiterated the certainty of a Communist victory in Korea.
2. **JAPAN:** Specific objectives underlying the Soviet decision to participate in the Japanese Peace Treaty discussions are unclear. The U.S.S.R. will at least be afforded an opportunity for propaganda, obstruction and delay and may advance proposals for basic revisions of the treaty, for a change in the terms of reference, or for discussion of the Japanese issue in conjunction with other Far Eastern problems. All indications are that Moscow will not accept the proposed U.S.-U.K. treaty without decisive modifications.

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3. **INDOCHINA:** The military situation remains static while the rehabilitation of Viet Minh units continues. There are no clear indications of Chinese Communist preparations for a major intervention but unconfirmed reports allege that Chinese air assistance may be provided for future Viet Minh operations.
4. **BURMA:** Coincident with increasing Burmese Communist activity in northern and central Burma, there have been reports of an increase in Chinese Communist military strength near the Burma border and of alleged Chinese Communist plans to invade the Kengtung District of Burma. Reported heavy reverses of KMT troops in Yunnan and their withdrawal into Burma provide CCF troops with the pretext for an incursion into northern Burma. Although the evidence is somewhat tenuous, there are some indications that the Chinese Communists may have decided on a stepped-up campaign in Burma as an alternative to the greater effort which would be required to achieve success in Indochina.
5. **GERMANY-AUSTRIA:** Soviet ground force field training in Germany continues on a small unit basis with engineering units of various armies training on the Elbe. There have been no new reports of the arrival of additional troops in Germany and the net increase since 1 January continues to be estimated at 69,000. Although [] has reported [] tank division was increased to wartime strength this spring and that other divisions were probably similarly expanded in strength, other available evidence suggests that this increase was probably to full peacetime rather than wartime T/O. Parking stands capable of accommodating TU-4 bombers are reportedly being installed at a Soviet airfield in Germany and TU-4's are allegedly to be moved to this field. There are some indications that the Soviet 59th Air Army in Austria and Hungary may soon receive jet bomber aircraft.
6. **SATELLITES:** Observations suggest a continuing increase in jet fighter aircraft in Hungary. AAA defenses and facilities in the Prague area are gradually increasing. An alleged Hungarian plan to attack Yugoslavia this fall is not supported by available evidence.
7. **NEAR EAST:** Indications of increasing Communist activity in the Near East include a larger volume of Communist propaganda in Egypt and greater Soviet attention to ethnic groups.
8. **GENERAL:** Concurrent with the World Youth Festival, an unusually strong Communist campaign has been launched against West German rearmament. The campaign includes calls for a program of strikes, sabotage and mass agitation in West Germany. East German statements have included a new note of urgency on the danger of war and

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listeners have been reminded to study the difference between "just and unjust" wars. Soviet propaganda continues to emphasize militant "peace" themes designed to mobilize popular opposition to the build-up of Western military strength and to define the U.S. attitude as one of "peace in words, aggression in policy." There are indications of increasing efforts of the Soviet bloc, notably Poland, to secure strategic materials from the West.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviet Armed Forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with little or no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of controversial problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies, in pursuing their major objectives, intend necessarily to avoid actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
2. The Communists have continued to improve their capabilities for a resumption of the offensive in Korea, and they are prepared militarily to exploit any breakdown in the cease-fire discussions. The Communist belief in victory in Korea, as expressed in their propaganda, does not appear dependent on the outcome of the negotiations.
3. Further major Chinese Communist military operations, other than in Korea, do not appear to be imminent, but support of the Viet Minh continues and there are increasing indications of Chinese Communist attention to Burma.
4. There are no firm indications of Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities in Europe or the Near East or to extend the area of conflict in the Far East in the immediate future. Soviet and Satellite military preparations in Europe continue, however, and there are indications of increasing Communist militancy in Western Europe. Reports continue to suggest the possibility that September may be an important period in Communist plans, particularly with respect to the Far East.

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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. KOREA.

- (1) Ground. Although clear evidence of last-minute enemy preparations and an intention to resume the offensive in the immediate future is lacking, continuing indications of a logistical and personnel build-up, and reports of enemy plans for a further offensive point to the steadily increasing Communist capability to undertake a major offensive with little warning. Vehicle sightings in enemy rear areas during the past week showed a daily average of 1197 as against 685 during the previous week. Average southbound sightings were 525 per day. Observations of supply installations continue to reveal an increase in enemy logistical capabilities, with disposal of supplies in forward areas, while reports of considerable stockpiles in extreme northeast Korea indicate that the logistical build-up is not limited to front-line areas but may also involve longer range planning. Although no new enemy units have been accepted, reports of the arrival of Chinese Communist replacements continue and there have been additional reports from South China of the movement of Fourth Field Army troops northward. The opinion [redacted] based in large part on reports of the northward movement of Fourth Field Army troops and conscription of Chinese Communist medical personnel, is that the Communists are preparing for a major military effort to be launched in Korea during September. An unconfirmed report states that defensive preparations continue in Mukden and that in that city a continuation of the Korean war is generally expected.

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[redacted] [redacted] information

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checks closely with previous reports, states that the U.S.S.R. has been training and equipping CCF armored units since last October. [redacted] the CCF Armored Force consists of three armored divisions and four independent tank regiments; that its training centers are located at Fengtai (near Peiping), Hsuehou (in east-central China), and Ssuningchieh (in Manchuria); [redacted]

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[redacted] the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions and the 1st Independent Regiment are now in Korea. Reports since late March have indicated that CCF mechanized forces may be in Korea but firm evidence of their presence has not yet been received and enemy forces in Korea have been estimated to have no

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more than 150 armored vehicles. Although actual sightings of enemy armor during recent weeks have not in themselves indicated an enemy intention to employ armor to any great extent, the various reports together with recent bridge construction and the filling in of anti-tank ditches in forward areas indicate that preparations for the commitment of larger enemy mechanized forces may be under way. PW reports also state that the North Korean 105th Division (which has been out of contact for some time) has reached a high state of training and probably has received its full complement of 120 tanks. Recent sightings of a large number of vehicle tracks in Korea further suggest that the supply of artillery is also increasing. According to an unconfirmed report, the supply of Soviet equipment to Chinese Communist units in South China has been delayed as the result of the diversion of supplies to Korea.

Recent reports continue to allege the presence in North Korea of small "Caucasian" combat or support units, although the presence of Soviet military personnel other than "advisors" and AAA troops has not been confirmed. A recent report of a "Caucasian" artillery regiment at Anju may refer to an AAA unit, as a Soviet AAA battalion has previously been reported at Anju. Another unconfirmed report of the arrival of a battalion of Soviet troops about 25 miles south of Pyongyang on 21 June may indicate the presence of a Soviet signal unit, as the troops were reported to have telegraphic equipment as well as weapons. According to the purported statement [redacted] in late July, there were at that time no organized Caucasian combat units in North Korea and Caucasians in Korea were limited to the Hungarian medical corps, Rumanian labor delegates, and an "International War Effort Mission", which is a propaganda group led by TASS newspapermen. PW reports continue to be generally negative with respect to the presence of Soviet or other Caucasian line units in either Korea or Manchuria, and no reports have been received identifying Soviet or Caucasian troops in Korea as specific units of the armies of the Soviet Union or its European Satellites. A recent report, which is otherwise considered fairly reliable, states that Soviet troop strength at Port Arthur on the Kwantung Peninsula of Manchuria is being increased. It is believed likely that this report may indicate the arrival of new recruits of the 1931 class, rather than the arrival of additional units in the Port Arthur area, where there is estimated to be a Soviet rifle army of four divisions.

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- (2) Air. An increase in enemy night air activity over Korea has been marked by the use of high performance conventional aircraft and some jets to intercept USAF night intruder

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missions. Use of slow, low performance aircraft in night attacks on U.N. ground positions appears to have ceased. Although there have been no major encounters between U.N. aircraft and enemy jets along the Yalu border recently, the enemy's determination to defend this frontier is apparent in the recent confirmation [redacted] of 83 aircraft (believed to be mostly MIG-15's) on Tatungkou Airfield near Antung. This represents the second operational jet airfield in the immediate border area.

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A recent report that 300 German PW jet pilots have been sent to Manchuria from the Soviet Union and are to be assigned to Manchurian bases to fly with the Chinese is unconfirmed. It is, however, entirely possible that Germans are to be used as ground personnel and conceivably, in far smaller numbers than 300, as pilots in the composition of an "international volunteer air force." The presence of German technicians in China in 1950 is accepted.

- (3) Political and Propaganda. There has been no basic change apparent in the Communist attitude on the cease-fire discussions. On the one hand Communist propaganda has continued to remain generally adamant with respect to the question of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, while, on the other, there has been no suggestion that the Communists are preparing to break up the discussions. The Communists at the Kaesong talks continue to refuse to accept the present front line of the U.N. forces as a basis for discussion or to proceed with discussion of other agenda items. A Chinese Communist suggestion that the U.N. attitude toward the demarcation line is in part a face-saving maneuver may have been designed to pave the way for Communist "face-saving" on the demarcation issue. Meanwhile, the North Korean radio broadcast a "pledge by Chinese volunteers" to Kim Il-sung that they "would drive the invaders into the sea," and Soviet broadcasts reiterated the certainty of a Communist victory should negotiations collapse. Although not new, such assertions have not received particular prominence in Soviet broadcasts recently, and the renewed expression of Soviet confidence in ultimate victory recalls Stalin's statement of February that the U.N. forces would be defeated if they rejected Peiping's proposals. Soviet broadcasts otherwise were marked by an increasing volume of material directed to the North Koreans (including repeated broadcasts of the Shvernik statement in Korean), although there was a decrease in over-all Soviet comment on the current military situation in Korea. Comment from Moscow on the stalemate has been confined to quotes from North Korean and Chinese Communist statements.

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In the meantime, the Soviet decision to attend the Japanese Peace Treaty discussions in San Francisco during September may have some connection with the Kaesong discussions. There have, however, been no indications as to whether the Soviets will seek to secure a cease-fire prior to the opening of the Japanese Treaty talks or whether they may bring up the Korean question at San Francisco in connection with a general discussion of Far Eastern problems.

b. JAPAN. The departure of the Soviet Ambassador from Peiping for Moscow on 3 August and the reported return to Peiping of the Chinese Communist Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. suggest that there was consultation between the Soviets and Chinese Communists prior to the surprise Soviet announcement to attend the Japanese Peace Treaty discussions. There have been some suggestions, from the delayed reaction in Communist propaganda to the Soviet announcement and the absence of mention of the decision in the Soviet press, that the U.S.S.R.'s decision to participate may have been a sudden one. The reasons for the Soviet decision are not clear, but by participating in the peace treaty discussions the U.S.S.R. will at least obtain an opportunity to exploit the dissatisfaction of several Asian countries with the treaty and to obstruct and delay the signing of the treaty. It is possible, as some Japanese Communists have suggested, that the U.S.S.R. may advance certain concessions (such as the repatriation of Japanese PW's) in order to gain other points in the treaty. The Soviet delegation may propose a change in the terms of reference and also attempt to use the conference as a propaganda forum for the discussion of the Japanese issue in conjunction with other Far Eastern questions, particularly if the U.S.S.R. now estimates that a Big Five conference is unlikely because of Western opposition. All indications are that Moscow will not accept the proposed U.S.-U.K. treaty without decisive modifications.

There have been no new reports of alleged Communist expectations of war in connection with the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty or of military preparations which would indicate plans for an attack on Japan in the near future.

c. CHINA. Apart from the additional evidence of the establishment of a Chinese Communist armored force, discussed above, there have been no significant military developments reported from China. There are no indications of preparations for an early attack on Formosa or Hong Kong.

d. INDOCHINA. The dispositions of major Viet Minh units in Tonkin and northern Annam have apparently remained static during the week, and there have been no important military developments. The Viet Minh continue to rehabilitate their divisions for future attacks, and one Viet Minh battalion is reported to have received special training from the Chinese Communists in assault on fortifications. There have been no clear indications of Chinese Communist preparations for an imminent major intervention in Indochina, although unconfirmed reports have stated that some type of Chinese Communist air assistance may be planned in

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conjunction with future Viet Minh operations. The majority of these reports, however, have referred to the use of Nanning airfield and reliable evidence now indicates that there is no air activity at this field. A high-level Sino-Viet Minh conference is alleged to have been held in Peiping in late July and the fact that Ho Chi Minh has been mentioned as a participant could indicate that a major decision on the Indochina problem may have been made. The possibility that the Chinese Communists consider the present stalemate in Indochina as a threat to their internal security is suggested by a recent Chinese Communist broadcast which asserted that as long as the Viet Minh are not victorious the Chinese Revolution will be menaced by the imperialists.

e. **BURMA.** Coincident with increasing Burmese Communist activity in northern and central Burma, there have been reports of an increase in Chinese Communist military strength near the Burma border and of alleged Chinese Communist plans to invade the Kengtung District of Burma. A reported increase in CCF strength in southern Yunnan from two to five divisions during recent months was probably dictated by the necessity of coping with KMT forces in the area, but has nevertheless increased Chinese Communist capabilities for an invasion of Burma. As quite reliable information now indicates that KMT forces in Yunnan have suffered heavy reverses and are reported withdrawing into Burma, Chinese Communist forces have both the pretext and capability to secure a foothold in northern Burma which would facilitate further assistance to the Burmese Communists. A report that the Chinese Communists are preparing to enter the Kengtung District in force is not confirmed, but it is entirely possible that the Chinese Communists have decided on a stepped-up campaign in Burma as an alternative to the greater effort which would probably be required to achieve success in Indochina. Possibly significant in this connection is the reported statement of the Burmese Communist Party leader, Than Tun, that North Burma would not only be the pivot of his anti-government struggle which would decide the Burmese people's revolution but that it would also determine "the entire liberation movement in Southeast Asia." Members of a Chinese Communist division near the Burma border are also alleged to have claimed that it is the Communist plan to invade Southeast Asia via Burma.

f. **INDIA-PAKISTAN.** The continuing threat of war between India and Pakistan may afford a further opportunity for Communist exploitation of deteriorating conditions in Asia. To date, there have been no indications of Soviet or Communist intervention or active interest in the situation, although the Soviet Ambassadors to both India and Pakistan have been in Moscow for some time.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. **GERMANY-AUSTRIA.**

- (1) Soviet Ground Force Field Training. No major changes in disposition of Soviet forces in Germany have been reported, and in general the summer training program continues to follow a normal pattern. Training is still being conducted

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on a small unit basis, and there are no indications of the imminence of large-scale maneuvers. Engineering units from various armies continue training in river crossing on the Elbe and some small-scale airborne training exercises have been reported.

- (2) Troop Movements. No additional reports of additional Soviet troop movement into Germany since 10 July have been received, and the net increase of Soviet troop strength in Germany since 1 January continues to be estimated at 69,000. A previous unconfirmed report suggesting an additional net increase of 45,000 resulting from moves through the crossing point at Guben, south of Frankfurt-on-Oder, (see Watch Committee Report No. 53) appears to have been refuted by negative reports from other sources covering this crossing point. It is possible that this information and another low-grade report stating that 20,000 Soviet troops from Poland began to occupy barracks in Dresden in late June may be Soviet-inspired.

- (3) Reported Increase in Strength of Soviet Units. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] tank division was increased, between March and May 1951, to full wartime T/O (11,000 - 12,000) and [REDACTED] this had also occurred in all armies in the Soviet Zone because of the "present international tension." [REDACTED] all units have 100 percent of their wartime T/E, that much of this equipment was removed from heavy preservatives during the spring, and that a group of high-ranking Soviet officers, including Marshal Konev, were to arrive in Germany in early August to determine the progress of the expansion program. This report has not been confirmed and other information tends to suggest that the strength increase may have represented an effort to attain the full peacetime rather than wartime T/O. This conclusion is supported by the fact that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] tank division was at only 60% of T/O in May, and by the fact that the troop influx into Germany (which largely occurred after May) would be insufficient to raise all units to wartime strength. All units in Germany are believed to have 100 percent of their T/E equipment available and removal of equipment from preservatives probably represents only normal seasonal preparations for field training. The reported arrival of Marshal Konev, C-in-C of Soviet Ground Forces, in the Soviet Zone on 1 August has not been confirmed, but a high-ranking inspection team normally visits the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany each year.

- (4) Soviet Air Activity. There are indications that concrete parking stands capable of accommodating TU-4 aircraft are being constructed in the Soviet Zone of Germany for the

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first time. According to two unconfirmed reports, Briesen Airfield (near Cottbus) will have 44 concrete parking stands, each of 118-foot diameter. A runway of approximately 8200 feet is presently under construction at this field. Not only would the stands accommodate TU-4's, [REDACTED] a conversation between Soviet officers in which it was mentioned that TU-4's are to be stationed at this field. The estimated date for completion of the construction at Briesen, which is one of seven airfields in East Germany where long runways are presently under construction, is 1 October 1951.

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A possible Soviet attempt to hinder navigation on the Berlin air corridors is indicated by reports of jamming of U.S. radio ranges by transmitters located east of the zonal boundary. A recent report states that the range station at Fulda, at the end of the corridor from Berlin to the U.S. Zone, was jammed by a powerful transmitter which transmitted the same call signs on exactly the same frequency.

There are some indications that the Soviet 59th Tactical Air Army in Austria and Hungary may be preparing to reequip at least some bomber units with jet aircraft. Unusual preparations appear to be under way at Deutsch-Wagram Airfield near Vienna, and jet bomber aircraft are reportedly to be stationed at Taszar Airfield in Hungary, where an 8000-foot runway has recently been completed.

b. SATELLITES.

- (1) Air Activity. A further build-up of Soviet air strength in the Satellites may be indicated by the observation of a [REDACTED] 68 MIG-15 aircraft on Tokel Airfield, Hungary, on 10 August. This represents an increase of 42 aircraft over the number observed on this field on 24 July. It is believed that the Hungarian Air Force is receiving transition training in jets at this Soviet Air Force field. In Czechoslovakia, a current lack of activity at airfields in Bohemia and Moravia suggests that a large segment of the Czech fighter air force may now be engaged in maneuvers in western Czechoslovakia in conjunction with ground force maneuvers. Reliable observations in Prague and its vicinity over the past several weeks have indicated that a gradual build-up of AAA defenses is under way and that increasing emphasis is being placed on AAA training.
- (2) Hungary. Available evidence does not support a recently reported plan for a projected Hungarian attack on Yugoslavia. According to the report, a slow withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary to the Soviet Union and Rumania, now under way or to begin shortly, is to be completed by the end of October prior to a possible Hungarian invasion of Yugoslavia. The Soviet plan allegedly is then to send in "volunteers" to

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aid Hungary in what is to be termed a "Yugoslav-instigated" invasion. There is no present evidence that Soviet forces are being withdrawn from Hungary, and there are no indications of preparations for imminent aggressive activity against Yugoslavia on the part of Hungary which does not have the capability of successfully invading Yugoslavia unaided.

c. NEAR EAST

- (1) Communist Activity Increasing. There are continuing indications of Soviet recognition of the Near East as an area deserving serious exploitation. A Middle East Peace Congress, one of a series of regional conferences projected by the World Peace Congress, is soon to be held, and an effort to link the Near East with over-all Communist efforts is reflected in the attendance of some 200 Near Eastern students at the Youth Festival in Berlin. An over-all increase in the amount of Soviet propaganda directed to the Near East has been observed during 1951. Alarm over the violence and vigor of local Communist propaganda, especially in Egypt, has recently been expressed by both the Secretary General of the Arab League and the Yugoslav Minister in Cairo. Several new Communist newspapers have appeared in Egypt during the summer and their financial backing appears to be strong. Egyptian publications other than the identifiably Communist press have also been urging friendship with the U.S.S.R. in a highly organized, skillful and subtle fashion which is not common in Egyptian journalism. Direct Soviet implication, at least to the extent of subsidy, appears obvious. Ethnic groups with separatist traditions, such as the Kurds, continue to receive attention in Soviet propaganda. While most of the propaganda effort is aimed at the Iranian Kurds, it also reaches sizeable numbers in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

- (2) Observations in Baku. [redacted] who recently spent several days in Baku in the Transcaucasus has reported that he observed no unusual military activities and that the Baku oil producing area did not appear to be protected by heavy AAA guns. It is probable, however, that his opportunities for observation were limited and it is believed that strong AAA defenses, which have been observed in other Soviet cities (notably Moscow), are probably also present at Baku.

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3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. PROPAGANDA. Concurrent with the opening of the World Youth Festival in Berlin, ostensibly devoted to peace, Soviet propaganda has become more aggressive. The Festival has been used as a platform for launching an unusually strong campaign against West German rearmament including calls for a program of strikes, sabotage and mass agitation in West Germany.

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East German statements have also included a new note of anxiety on the danger of war and listeners have been reminded to study the difference between "just and unjust wars." Meanwhile, Soviet propaganda continues to emphasize militant "peace" themes designed to mobilize popular opposition in Western Europe to the rebirth of Western strength. Communist propaganda targets have included "U.S. encouragement" of resurgent fascism in Germany and Japan, the arrival of U.S. troops as "permanent occupiers" of Western Europe, the drive of U.S. monopolies for war profits, and the familiar theme of U.S. atrocities in Korea. Although the Truman-Shvernik exchange continues to be widely publicized in the U.S.S.R., editorial comment attempts to show a "peace in words, aggression in policy" attitude on the part of the U.S.

b. **DRIVE FOR STRATEGIC MATERIALS.** There are continued indications of Polish pressure to obtain strategic goods from Western nations in trade negotiations. As a condition for the delivery of Polish coal, Poland has demanded that Finland import aluminum and cobalt for resale to Poland and that Austria deliver embargo-size ball bearings at the rate of \$10,000 worth per month for the coming year. Despite these and other efforts to secure strategic commodities from the West, however, available evidence does not indicate that the Soviet bloc is attempting to secure such commodities by any fixed date in the near future.

for 
JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
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